Chapter 6 of the Lofstedt report is all about better engagement with the EU. In view of the UK’s latest brushes with EU leaders over the common currency and financial regulation, this may not work. I know technically the UK has quite a say in the running of the EU but in reality, its workings rely on co-operation, alliances, ‘give and take’, long lunches and a large expense account.

Now why is Lofstedt advocating peace and love and all that? Well, as many have pointed out, much of UK legislation originates from the EU. This is true of every member state too. That means that there is not that much room for the UK unilaterally modifying it. Yes, there is often some scope (more so with directives), but not much in terms of substance. It is therefore better to make it fit for purpose from the start. In real terms, that will always be a difficult one – because the application is EU wide, so there will always be some compromise (and perhaps quite divergent ideas about how best to do something).

We live in separatist times. Centralisation has given way to the desire for local government, even with its increased costs. But there is no doubt that EU membership has its benefits too. Not least, the harmonisation and removal of barriers to trade – two of the main purposes of the EU’s existence.

It is noted that EU legislation can be somewhat prescriptive. This is not all bad because of the greater clarity it can give to those who have little time to interpret its meaning. It is also noted that some EU legislation has questionable benefits compared to its implementation costs. Financial considerations are not usually the only considerations, otherwise we’d probably never put anyone in prison (and there’s another argument in itself). But what comes in for a sound beating is something that should never have been brought in in the first place – those eye and eyesight tests that employers have to pay for for ‘regular’ computer users. These are generally regarded as an unjustifiable burden. Similar costs far outweighing benefits arguments can be made for legislation on artificial optical radiation (which had zero impact because the risks and controls were well known and already implemented).

But the point is that we can’t change these so easily. Instead, the process for evaluating the costs and benefits (i.e. impact assessments) should be more robust at EU level. It should be risk and evidence -based. Now there’s a thought.

Professor Lofstedt now turns to the regulations themselves. The focus of attention is those regulations that everyone has already suspected are dodgy and knows shouldn’t really be there. They add little, if anything. Some of these were brought in for a particular issue that no-one can quite remember and, quite honestly, now look a little embarrassing. Well, intentioned, but lame. You know the sort, like requiring someone to tell you that they are a terrorist and if they don’t (and they are), then they’ve lied and that’s a serious offence (yeah, right, like they care). It only ever acts as an inconvenience for the law abiding and those that aren’t law-abiding, don’t often get caught.

The requirement to notify HSE if you have a Conventional Tower Crane, is one such case (not the small plastic remote control toy ones – it’s the real ones we want). I assume by painting it in psychedelic colours, you could get away with not having to register it (because it then could be argued that it is “unconventional”?). Even though they only came in around 2010 (amended in the same year) Lofty thinks that they should now go. And he’s probably right.

A similar point is made with the first aid regulations. Specifically, HSE approval of training for first aiders. I agree, this seems a little anomalous. OK, set standards and give guidance but treat it like most other safety and health training, insist that it is suitable, sufficient, appropriate and effective. Indeed, training ‘approvals’ for many qualifications are routinely and adequately controlled via awarding bodies. HSE is acting a bit like an awarding body here.

When it comes to Construction, the CDM regulations seem to have been instrumental in adding to the burden of paperwork and generating a myriad of training accreditation and competency schemes. This can be disproportionately burdensome for smaller projects. Not least the vast number of passport-type schemes that sprang up overnight. I wouldn’t mind but these passports don’t even get you into another country – well, maybe, Narnia.

Other regulations are also considered. My favourite is the portable appliance testing racket. Although there is some quite good HSE guidance on recommended testing frequencies for portable appliances, many companies still get told that they have to do everything annually. Yet another classic is the over zealous interpretation of work at height regulation – which some have interpreted as meaning that ladders are banned. Loftstedt’s answer to all of this is for the HSE to review the legislation ad guidance. Maybe, but if the guidance is already very good, it’s more the message isn’t getting through. The voice of the charlatan is louder.

On other matters, the HSE is commended for its sterling work on helping businesses understand how to interpret the law (especially ‘reasonably practicable’) but obviously more needs to be done. No doubt, this has all been added to HSE’s wish list to Father Christmas. But have they been naughty or have they been nice?

Chapter 4 of Lofty’s report takes a look at the scope of UK regulations. In particular it’s interested to see whether that proportionate, risk-based approach is applied. One might argue that bigger, riskier businesses should have to do more to satisfy the law. There are also economies of scale, whereby larger businesses are resourced to do things that smaller businesses find much more difficult (or at least proportionately more costly). But the fact is that often even small businesses do engage in high risk activities. The professor argues logically that the regulations should remain risk-based (and not company size based), but smaller businesses should be given more support and help in complying.

The point is also made that there can be disagreement over what ‘low risk’ business really means – ill health is often ignored in such an assessment of a business sector. Nonetheless, disquiet at the disproportionate effort for small, low risk businesses has resulted in the European Commission looking again at whether formal, written risk assessment is really necessary in this case. This might be a good thing, if we can decide what sort of businesses are in scope. On the other hand, the simple on-line, checklist assessment tools that HSE have now produced for small businesses might obviate the need for this exemption.

Lofty tackles the issue of the self-employed. It appears that some would have self-employed people exempted from everything. But, to my mind, that makes no sense. Instead, really, just like any other businesses, it should depend on the risk of what they do. They of course need more help with understanding their obligations and with compliance. The report recommends that the self-employed are only made exempt if they undertake low risk activities (no potential risk of harm to others). I’m not so sure that they will be so easy to decide, unless there is some specific list of prescribed activities. I wish you luck with that one, unless you happen to have a government lobbyist in your employ.

The report also discusses the application of safety legislation to schools and emergency services. Many of these issues are already being tackled as a result of recommendations from Dave Young, for example. Even though Lord Young was later sacked (or did he resign?) for inappropriate comments about the recession, he is still fondly remembered. Speaking your mind seems to carry huge risk, causing immense political fallout, personal damage and offence. I recommend it being included in the next raft of safety legislation from Brussels, regardless of whether you are self-employed or not.

Yesterday, I happened to be in the Stoke-on-Trent area, hoping to cut across the A50 to pass by Loughborough on my way back down South. The A50 was unfortunately closed, the radio lady said, due to a diesel fuel spill. The ‘road ahead closed’ signs confirmed this but offered little advice as to an alternative. I occasionally use a Sat Nav but this insisted that I keep returning to the blocked route in some voyeuristic tendency.

The point is, accidents are costly. The costs go way beyond the immediate accident and can be difficult to predict or estimate with any certainty (yes, there are models for this sort of thing on a macroscopic scale, but the impact on each individual is more variable). In my case, it was easy to see the effects spread out like tendrils as people searched for alternative routes, causing severe delays elsewhere.

Lofty reminds us, in chapter 3 that regulations also have a cost. In negative terms, this is often referred to as a burden on business – all the time and effort spent in even trying to understand what is required, let alone misinterpreting it and even over-complying with; for example, ridiculously detailed quantified risk assessments for obvious risks with obvious, established, simple solutions. There have been attempts to estimate this financially and it is always a large figure; in boy-racer terms, it’s at least several hundred Bugatti Veyrons or several billion beer tokens. It seems too, that most of the costs are associated with a small number of demanding regulations (isn’t this always the case?); echoes of the Pareto principal. These regulations seem obsessively bureaucratic and administrative.

Overall though, the cost of accidents can dwarf the cost of compliance with related regulation. In other words, compliance with regulation avoids those accidents. Now, of course, not all regulation is effective or has a proven ‘protective link’. Indeed it is quite difficult to prove such a link categorically. Nonetheless, there is a “generally accepted” (that means no-one knows for sure) negative correlation between them i.e. that regulation reduces accidents or at least it is a significant factor. Clearly there are many factors at play, including the insurance industry and changes within our industrial profile over the years. The reduced accident rate also negatively correlates with the increased interest in bungee jumping and cosmetic surgery, demonstrating that only beautiful people should take risks.

Complying with regulations designed to avoid said accidents then means that you may not be entirely convinced that such accidents would ever have happened anyway (remember there is a certain underlying randomness about accidents – a few seconds earlier and it might have been a near miss that you might not even have noticed).

Prof Loftstedt again reminds us that one of the main problems in practice is misapplication (over-compliance). This is the ‘bonkers conkers’ movement, where over-restrictive rules have been created and health and safety blamed. The real reasons may not even be health and safety-related, but health and safety is conveniently hated and ridiculed already, so a little more will not hurt.

We’ll look at some of these in the next blog.

In Chapter 2 of the Loftstedt report (see previous blogs), Lofty sets out his guiding principles for the review. Since he’s a professor and, unlike politicians, has a reputation to think of, he’s unashamedly abandoned to an evidence-based approach. Not all decisions need to be justified by verifiable evidence – what I decide to have for lunch is based more on whim (well, actually, on what happens to be in the cupboard). Neither is evidence the whole of decision making. Some judgement, consideration of socio-economic factors as well as any number of reasonable assumptions will also be needed.

Note that in science (or even social science) open mindedness is also important. Evidence is gathered to aid decision making rather than being gathered to support a decision that has already been made. This does not preclude the adoption of hypotheses (tentative ideas of the way things appear) – but the evidence is gathered in order to illuminate (refute or confirm). This can be a stranger to politics where sweeping statements are frequently made as if they are fact. Taxation inevitably follows.

Loftstedt duly gathered written and verbal evidence from stakeholders (this has no connection with vampires or carnivores). This is always a tricky one. You are more likely to get responses from people who have strong feelings (in this case, usually against legislation) so there is always the possibility of bias and therefore an incorrect picture of what things are really like. That said, even the biased can have a point to make. Lofty was careful to get a balanced view – at least access a wide range of stakeholder types. Importantly, he also made a handful of site visits to ‘witness the impact of regulation first hand’ and made sure that his examples were real, rather than anecdotal.

Loftstedt also reinforces his ‘guiding principle’ that regulation should be risk based (i.e. proportionate to the risk) rather than hazard based. In the modern post-Robens regulatory world, this may seem strange to have to say this – much modern regulation is risk based. But, there has been debate, especially where risk cannot be well characterised or quantified, leading to a precautionary approach based more on the intrinsic hazard. Even safety people can focus obsessively on hazards instead of risks, even when they are well characterised. In reality the risk is what counts and is what makes the hazard understandable. The identification of hazards is just a stepping stone to assessment of the risk. Indeed, in describing hazards we often also describe the risk (or at least the potential consequences) to make its relevance more obvious.

An important aspect here is holistic risk – one of the eight principles in the schedule to the management of health and safety at work regs. In focussing on a specific hazard, we can end up skewing our efforts and actions around it and ignoring the bigger picture. This again, is the law of unintended consequences. Loftstedt points out there is often a trade off here – looking at the bigger picture can sometimes afford the opportunity to lower the overall risk. Looking at risks in isolation, implementing greater measures to control a specific risk without any consideration for its wider effects, may end up driving up the overall risk. Loftstedt uses the example of actions taken after a fatal train crash whereby a seemingly reasonable temporary measure of train speed restrictions caused delays which drove commuters to their cars instead (which carries a higher risk of fatal accident).

In other words, whilst Loftstedt does not exactly say it this way, this is the critical point that risks interact. You cannot just look at each risk (or even hazard) in isolation – you modify other related risks in treating it. This is especially true when it comes to human behaviour, when sometimes the choices we make are subject to many subtle factors.

I note as well that Loftstedt is not opposed to burdens on business per se. Rather he is opposed to burdens that have little or no health and safety benefit, in terms of proportionately reducing risk. Business needs regulation but it has to count – benefiting society. I have decided that I quite like that viewpoint.

As promised, I will be looking at some of the Loftstedt report in more detail over a series of blogs. I write this one from Dubai (as the ‘Hood’ famously said in an episode of Thunderbirds – ‘no-one can stop me now, already I have shaken off the police’, shortly before he careered off an unfinished bridge into a lake).

History is a wonderful thing – or so the History teachers tell us. Loftstedt begins his report in Chapter 1 by reminding us all about how things used to be. Before the 1974 health and safety at work act, things were complex, prescriptive and overly fixated on the workplace fixtures and fittings. Things had moved on and there was more a need to look at systems, management and human interactions. The problem with humanity is that we never really see the whole picture. There is some value in looking back and trying to fudge what we see into categories and genres but these are artificial constructs that were certainly not apparent to the people at the time. No doubt in 40 years time, our successors will be looking back and saying ‘what were they thinking of’.

The world is complicated and there are lots of influences pulling politicians and legislators in different directions. There are also many different views of how to proceed. Loftstedt points out that events such as Piper Alpha fire/explosion in 1988 initiated additional regulatory controls that had previously not been envisaged. The need to notify HSE about tower cranes is another example – this isn’t a ‘train spotter thing’. As a result, simple frameworks rapidly become more complex and piecemeal. Hence the need for regular reviews and consolidations. Businesses have become fed up with the increased regulation which they think is getting in the way of them doing anything. I must admit, even as a health and safety person, it is difficult to keep track of everything. Sometimes, it’s not that requirements are onerous, it’s just where to find everything and especially being sure you’ve taken account of all the amendments that might be out there. Some websites take care of this for you but they are not always fully up to date.

Businesses are well aware for the need for health and safety regulation. They don’t generally want to throw it all away. Non-one wants a return to the death rates of bygone ages.

I like the fact that Lofty recognises the ‘law of unintended consequences’. This is a well known concept. When we try to change things we can introduce new risks. Some of these are opportunities but some are threats. We don’t always think things through. He therefore urges caution. Next time, we’ll light the blue touch paper….

Last year the government asked Ragnar Lofsted to review Health and Safety regulation in the UK. This is always tricky. It can be the kiss of death to any career aspirations if you say the wrong thing. But, like any good researcher he figured he would gather some data first. After all, who could argue with the evidence? I’m sure that’s how the Iraq inquiry started.

In this and subsequent blogs, I thought I’d review some of his points and findings. It’s over a 100 pages long and there are no pictures. Though there are a few bar charts and tables. Ragner makes a very good point right at the beginning. It’s a point that rings true and most have recognised from all the silly stories on health and safety that have lead to excessive application.

The point is that H&S regulation in the UK is not fundamentally flawed or excessive. Yes, of course everyone can point to isolated examples of poor, duplicative or excessive, meaningless regulation. But , it tends to be the interpretation and application that can be excessive and wrong. This causes businesses to feel that they have to do far more than was ever intended. It causes some to feel swamped under a weight of regulation, and especially the fear of civil action. Points similar to this were made by Dave Young in his report out last year too.

The general movement of UK regulations from prescriptive to goal setting (though in reality always a mixture) has always been difficult. On the one hand, it offers flexibility and allows proportionate, risk-based responses. On the other hand, it means that the adequacy of some measures is a cause for argument. That is, it can be difficult to be certain that you have done enough or what is considered reasonable. But that is unfortunately what life is like. The regulations are underpinned by codes of practice and guidance which offer practical advice; but these cannot consider every eventuality and, in some cases, become out of date. They have been accused of being too technical too – but to be much use, surely some of them need to be?

Ragner points out depressingly that, though we may aspire to change some of the dysfunctional legislation, in practice we cannot do so very easily. Some of the confusion in legislation is of our own making – duplication, poor wording, lots of bits spread over many different pieces of legislation etc. Some of this can be helped by consolidation. But much of what we have stems directly from the UK’s membership of the EU. Short of an invasion, we have to move through the democratic process of influencing the parliament and council of the EU – that means long and lavish lunches. And, unless you have been on another planet, they are rather concerned about other matters, such as economic stability of its members.

In terms of enforcement, Ragner recommends that HSE essentially becomes responsible for enforcing most things, instead of the local authorities (i.e. councils). Yes, that could make it more consistent but HSE already faces a resourcing issue.

The government has issued a response to Ragner’s report – responding to each recommendation. Overall, it seems behind the recommendations, at least their objectives. They have committed to a timetable of reforms as a result, just to demonstrate…er…their commitment.

As an alien just visiting earth, I have observed that humans have a capacity for invention that is staggering. For those brought up on ‘human factors and ergonomics’ (HFE) thinking, you’ll know that this can lead to serious accidents, crime or both. A casual observer might be forgiven for thinking that the health and safety profession and the law seem to spend much of their time trying to stamp out innovation ( or at least make it very difficult) and make people use standardised, tried and tested approaches. There is a lot to be said for this but it can also stifle innovation. Granted there is often flexibility within rules and procedures for consideration of significant changes. Some industries and companies are undoubtedly more innovative than others but by and large we feel safer when things are being done in established, familiar ways.

In investigating accidents, we might not be looking at what people did right (or even nearly so) or what innovations they were inadvertently introducing. Instead, there’s a focus on what people did wrongly according to our procedure. This is an occupational hazard in safety – risks are transformed into a nemesis that must be eliminated or controlled rather than managed. If we judge an accident sequence purely against an established procedure or method, we will end up with a long list of things people did wrong. Looking through a different filter could enable retrieval of ideas for how to do things very differently.

There are numerous pictures spread over the internet of so-called ‘fools’ and ‘idiots’ flouting established safe practices to get the job done. Some of these are obviously counterfeit but many are not. They are often held up as examples to ridicule in a sometimes self-righteous way. There is sometimes a competition to discover the most foolish example. To ridicule others for apparent idiocy (and to do idiot things) is entirely human – I do it, you do it, we all do it. Yes, we may present it as a ‘learning point’ (and some indeed are valuable for this) but still these presentations are tainted with ridicule as if we, as safety people, could never do such a thing.

But within some of these examples are illustrations of man’s ingenuity to circumvent immediate difficulties or frustrations or increase efficiency (sometimes born of laziness). This is active problem solving at work. Granted, they may not be very effective or appropriate (hence the accident or near miss) but still there is the start of an idea. I’m suggesting that such observations should be given more consideration rather than discounted as idiotic safety violations.

Innovation is, by its very nature, untried and so can be inherently more dangerous. Mistakes can easily be made due to a failure to fully understand the context, lack of proper materials and time constraints. Solutions by individuals are sometimes quickly fashioned on site and not quite up to the job, even though the basic idea is there.

I am not saying that people who don’t follow safe procedures are right. I am not saying that people don’t do genuinely ‘stupid’ things (which even they will admit when they’ve thought about it). But I am saying that we can be guilty of discounting everything they did as ‘stupid’ and unsafe. We can be guilty of thinking there is only a single method for doing a job safely (our way) and not truly learning from them to do things differently.

It may have escaped your notice but the UK has a law about Sunbeds – the Sunbeds (Regulation) Act 2010. I know laying in the Sun is a complete mystery for half the world (the half that actually has Sunny days) but to the other half (the bits that don’t get much Sun), it’s perfectly understandable. I will let you guess which half the of the world the UK resides.

It turns out that a little bit of sun is quite good for you but too much Sun is harmful (that’s probably why we say ‘too much’). That really isn’t surprising. Now we all know that launching yourself at the Sun is probably harmful – I mean, it’s rather hot for a start. Staring at the Sun is also obviously a bit awkward too – it doesn’t even blink and that can get a little embarrassing after a while. But even if you walk around casually minding your own business, it can get to work on you – rather a nice tan (whatever your original skin colour may have been) but also burns and skin cancer. So, many people (especially the young and those who are rather too old to know that they are no longer young) love to get tanned artificially. That could be a euphemism for getting drunk but that’s not what I meant. No, these people go into small rooms, loaded with UV lamps, take most of their clothes off and spend a few minutes sipping cocktails. I’m told it can be addictive, especially if you want to impress your friends with that good looking, accelerated aging, cancer skin look.

The people who make laws have had enough. Now that might be because they aren’t the sort of people that do the sunbed thing and feel left out. An old fat body is still an old fat body – tanned or not. But it might also be for good reasons. So, what do these laws have to say about the matter? Anything useful?

Firstly, they make it clear that children (people under 18 years old) are not allowed to use commercial sunbed parlours. The skin of young people is especially vulnerable but they are also the ones who probably want it most. Clearly, someone has also done some thinking because children can get to use sunbeds if it’s for some genuine medical treatment. I can feel a whole range of mysterious medical conditions arising that can only be cured by extensive sunbed treatment shortly before the holiday season. The rest of the law scopes out the subject matter of possible future regulations on this subject.

For example, in scope is the possibility of restricting sale or hire of sunbeds to children (presumably for home use to try and get round not being allowed in the commercial premises); making commercial premises give and display information about sunbed health risks; making protective eyewear available to customers and trying to ensure it’s worn when using the sunbeds. It turns out that Wales (a proud country within the UK) has brought in those extra measures in local, regional legislation. They go by the snappy title of the Sunbed (Regulation) Act 2010 (Wales) Regulations 2011. You can tell that simple English was not a consideration.

These regulations go to the point of insisting that a supervisor is present on the premises to make sure no children are using sunbeds, assess the skin type of adult customers, give them information and advice (like get a life…) on health risks and safe operation of the machine and so on.

The humble sunbed will soon be demonised. Soon you may not even be able to use the word sunbed in polite company. It will go underground – which is somewhat ironic.

Many people will at least be aware of the safety management system affectionately known as HSG65 (the document series and number, in fact). It arrived more than 20 years ago. Even though it’s technically a UK thing, instantly conjuring up images of a tranquil, green and pleasant land, haymaking in the fields of England, bothys in Scotland, Doctor Who in Wales and skipping along the giant’s causeway in Northern Ireland, it is difficult to deny its global importance. HSG65 stuck as the unofficial title because it was considerably less dull and far more memorable than the actual title. It also puts one in mind of how you might be addressed if you were jailed for not having implemented it – names are for tomb stones and numbers are for prison.

Whilst the UK government is struggling to think of something worthwhile to do, other than dodging bailing out the Euro zone, HSG65 is being revised (or ‘refreshed’ as they like to put it). The draft is currently out for consultation, the purpose of which is, like all consultations, to share the blame.

When I first read HSG65, I found that I forgot each page the instant I turned it over. I thought there was something wrong with me (well, there is) but it was all that woolly management speak that sounded great but didn’t stick. But I guess it felt it had to, because it was trying to speak to managers, using their language. Well, now it’s moved on and recognised that the attention span of most has reduced considerably – I mean, we have to be constantly fiddling with our mobiles, texting, waiting for that important email, tweeting and updating facebook and linkedIn with anything that passes through our mind.

The revised draft version is in three main parts (there is a fourth part, but this is simply a list of references and links). There’s an overview, then evidence criteria to look for (to evaluate whether you’ve a management system that’s up to it) and finally, more detail for the committed who are actually trying to implement or improve things. The original stretched to over 100 pages long, being revised and reprinted many times. This draft is about a third of that.

Part 1, the overview, is very short and succinct. And that’s good, because there is no need for it to be any longer. The style and language are more accessible than before. There’s also a distinct emphasis on the familiar general management repetitive cycle of plan-do-check-act (PDCA), commonly referenced in all the ISO management system standards (and then promptly ignored in them). Indeed, as it stands, HSE plan to ditch the original POPMAR model framework (Policy-Organising-Planning-Measuring-Audit-Review) or at least subjugate it beneath the PDCA mantra. They make it very clear that you don’t need a formally recognised management system, but you do need a consistent system rather than fire-fighting with single interventions to fix things.

HSE also strongly emphasise that safety culture (attitudes and behaviours) is absolutely central to whether safety is actually managed effectively. This is because it is people that have to develop, implement and maintain all the nice little policies and procedures, identify and control risks and all the rest. Without this proper balance and perspective, paperwork (i.e. the documentation of the system) can become an end in itself and this is a recipe for disaster.

Part 1 then goes onto explore elements of a safety management system around the PDCA framework. That is, what you’d be doing and what you would have in place at any one time. That gets rid of those silly arguments about whether something is a ‘planning’ or ‘implementing’ activity when the truth is that many activities are a bit of both – you don’t wait till you’ve planned absolutely everything in fine detail in your business before you do anything.

Part 2, the evidence criteria, is also quite short. It is nicely set out in tables to show you what management elements look like when they are done well and, importantly, what they look like when they are done badly or not at all. This takes you through issues of leadership and management, competence, and worker involvement. It also distinguishes between some different sizes and types of organisations, recognising that things may be far less formal in small businesses.

In the leadership area, for example, it indicates what you’d be looking for in a leader (you know, a top manager). Many of these are expressed as questions to ask yourself (assuming you are a leader) or use to beat up on a leader (if you aren’t doing that already). Granted some questions are very high level and are more involved but the juxtaposition of good and bad examples helps to clarify. I like the one about visibility – which should be easy to verify for most humans. The classic flouting your own site safety rules is also in there as a negative indicator. A leader who aspires to be truly bad (I can understand the attraction), should find a wealth of ideas to upon which to model himself.

I like the fact that it rails against that “silo mentality”. It doesn’t serve to separate out health and safety as some kind of add on to business management. It treats it as something that should be integrated. For example, it takes the presence of ISO 9001 (formally a quality management system) as likely evidence of having a good business system in place (or at least potentially); I know that isn’t always true, but having at least some good business management system in place could just mean that it needs to be tweaked to make sure safety is fully encompassed. All businesses that are managed effectively, working to a common business goal, by definition, have to have integrated processes.

Part 3 is by far the longest section and aimed at implementers and improvers, greatly expanding on part 2. The idea is that you find out where you’re not doing so well from part 2 and look to part 3 for ideas on what to do about it. There is always the option of doing nothing and sharing a cell with HSG65.

A theme of the old HSG65 POPMAR model was the 4C concept (control, co-operation, communication, competence). This was considered central to developing a health and safety culture. Part 3 of the draft asks the question as to whether the 4C model is still relevant. I actually don’t find it all that helpful, not only because it was difficult to remember what each C actually stood for (I can think of lots of words beginning with C that might not be relevant at this time) but also because categorising things in this way can fool you into thinking they are distinct, independent concepts, when they are not. For example, communication is involved in all the other three and control also relies on others co-operating (or at least complying). Thus, things you might do for one C will impact on the others. They interact. I think the replacement by themes of leadership, competence and worker involvement says all the important bits (albeit, there still is overlap). Nonetheless, part 3, still cannot relinquish the 4C’s framework upon which to hang material together, but I personally think it awkward and unnecessary, especially considering it discusses worker involvement and competence in just about each one of the C’s.

Part 3 is framed as an action list, identifying the likely roles for the actions too. This is, on the whole direct and helpful, but occasionally dives into diffuse, woolly, management things “somebody, somewhere, should do something” that leaves you confused and indifferent. For example “demonstrate commitment to the process” is probably not worth saying on its own. But having said that, there’s a lot of practically helpful stuff such as: Make a statement of intention and sign it; if the risks are complex, think about hiring an expert to advise you or train up one of your own people. Obvious to most I know, but worth saying.

So, does it work? Good things come in threes – clover leaves, blind mice, pigs, wise men, McDonalds meal deals – so the 3-part approach is bang on. This lends itself to not having to wade through mountains of irrelevant C (just think of a suitable four letter word here) to discover “I still haven’t found what I’m looking for..” (apologies to U2). You get an overview, a set of criteria to help you decide and some practical pointers on how to fill any gaps. All in less than 40 pages (it is bound to get bigger after the consultation).